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Declarative memory is usually described as consisting
of two systems: semantic and episodic memory.
Between these two poles, however, may lie a third
entity: personal semantics (PS). PS concerns knowl-
edge of one’s past. Although typically assumed to be
an aspect of semantic memory, it is essentially absent
from existing models of knowledge. Furthermore, like
episodic memory (EM), PS is idiosyncratically personal
(i.e., not culturally-shared). We show that, depending
on how it is operationalized, the neural correlates of
PS can look more similar to semantic memory, more
similar to EM, or dissimilar to both. We consider three
different perspectives to better integrate PS into exist-
ing models of declarative memory and suggest experi-
mental strategies for disentangling PS from semantic
and episodic memory.
PS: an intermediate form of declarative memory?
Declarative memory is typically described as consisting of
two systems, EM and semantic memory. EM entails recol-
lecting unique events within their specific spatio-temporal
context, imbued with a sense of the self mentally traveling
through time to re-experience the original event [1]. By
contrast, semantic memory pertains to culturally-shared
general knowledge (including facts and vocabulary), de-
tached from its context of acquisition and devoid of any
subjective sense of mental time travel [1–3].
Although drawing a stark contrast between episodic and
semantic memory has proved useful in spurring cognitive
neuroscience research, these systems have largely been
investigated in isolation, leading to an under-appreciation
of their interactions and of potentially intermediate forms
ofmemory. One such form ofmemory is personal semantics
(PS). In early case studies, this type of memory was de-
scribed in patients who could retrieve few or no EMs, yet
showed knowledge of events from their personal past [4–7],
resembling a ‘skeleton autobiography’ [5] that seemed ‘to
be drawn entirely from a personal pool of generalized
knowledge’ [4].
The paradox of PS is that it is highly personal (like EM),
yet, at the same time, devoid of any subjective sense of
recollection and detached from its context of acquisition
(like semantic memory). Crucially, although PS is typically
assumed to be a form of semantic memory, formal studies
of PS have been rare and PS is not well integrated into
existing models of semantic memory and knowledge (e.g.,
[3,8,9]). In the present review, we describe four ways in
which PS has been operationalized in previous studies and
show that how one defines PS can influence how it com-
pares to EM and general semantic memory (GS). We then
consider three different perspectives to better integrate PS
into existing models of episodic and semantic memory, and
offer suggestions for future work.
When PS appears similar to semantic memory (and
dissimilar to EM): autobiographical facts
The most common conceptualization of PS is as a set of
autobiographical facts (e.g., ‘Nicholas is the name of my
youngest brother.’) in contrast to general knowledge of the
world (e.g., ‘Nicholas was a 4th-century saint.’) and EMs of
unique events (‘I could see thatmy brother Nicholas’ hands
were shaking during his speech at my wedding’). Autobio-
graphical facts share with EM the notion of personal
content. However, in PS this personal content refers to a
common organizing theme, whereas in EM it refers to a
subjective first-person perspective [10]. In addition, auto-
biographical facts, like GS facts but unlike EMs, are
detached from their original context of acquisition [11].
When PS is studied using autobiographical facts, it
appears similar to GS and dissimilar to EM (Table 1). In
priming studies with healthy people, both autobiographi-
cal and general facts can be primed by related knowledge
and can be verified by participants more quickly than can
EMs [12,13]. In neuropsychological studies using the
Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; [14], Box 1),
the typical finding is of impaired EM with relatively pre-
served PS and GS [7,15–18], especially in patients with
medial temporal lobe (including hippocampal) lesions.
A few studies have described the opposite pattern, that
is, impaired PS and GS despite relatively preserved EM
[19,20], most often following extensive lesions or degener-
ation in lateral temporal regions.
Although the aforementioned neuropsychological stud-
ies suggest that PS and GS are usually impaired or pre-
served together, the few extant neuroimaging studies that
have compared PS, GS, and EM have reported similar, but
distinct neural correlates for PS and GS. In a series of
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studies using sentence verification, Maguire and collea-
gues reported that, even though PS and GS-related activa-
tions overlapped in lateral temporal and medial prefrontal
regions [Brodmann area (BA) 10], the PS condition showed
greater activation relative to GS in a left-lateralized net-
work including the medial prefrontal cortex, retrosplenial
cortex, temporal pole, and temporoparietal junction
[21,22]. A concordant structural MRI study in Alzheimer’s
patients reported a correlation between temporopolar
volumes (especially on the left side) and PS as measured
by the AMI [23]. Autobiographical facts are typically rela-
tively idiosyncratic (e.g., I know that my brother owns an
old blue station wagon), which is compatible with the
presumed role of the temporal pole in the retrieval of
information associatedwith unique objects and individuals
(e.g., [24,25]). The greater medial prefrontal activation for
PS than for GS in Maguire’s neuroimaging studies is
consistent with the putative role of this brain region in
self-referential processing [26]. Interestingly, compared to
EM, PS has been associated with lesser activity in these
three brain regions (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex, temporal
pole, and retrosplenial cortex), as well as in the hippocam-
pus [21,22,27]. Taken together, these studies suggest that
this form of PS hasmore in common with GS than with EM
and are compatible with the idea of PS being a sub-domain
of GS, with overlapping but partly distinct neural bases
(Box 2). On the other hand, the fact that some brain regions
(i.e., the medial prefrontal cortex, temporal pole and retro-
splenial cortex) are differentially responsive to the three
types of memory, with a decreasing pattern of activation
from EM to PS to GS, is compatible with the idea of PS
being an intermediate system on a continuum of abstrac-
tion from EM to GS (Box 3).
When PS appears similar to EM (and dissimilar to GS):
repeated events and autobiographically significant
concepts
Repeated events
A typical EM concerns a single personal experience, where-
as semantic memory is based on the extraction of similari-
ties across many events. PS is sometimes operationalized
as intermediate between these two poles: repeated person-
al experiences (e.g., bringing my brother to school every
day; Table 1). For such events, it is assumed that one
typically does not remember a single instance, but instead
has extracted the common characteristics from the series of
similar but separate episodes ([28]; but see Box 4). Repeat-
ed events are generally remembered less vividly and asso-
ciated with lower ratings of personal significance and
emotion than are unique episodes [29–31]. On the other
hand, memory for repeated events appears to be similar to
memory for unique events in some ways: both usually
contain visual imagery [32,33] and contextual information
[34], often from a first-person perspective [35]. Accordingly,
it has been proposed that EMmaymediate recollection not
only for unique events, but also for repeated or summa-
rized events [36,37].
The few extant neuropsychological studies of memory
for repeated events have observed parallel perturbations of
Table 1. The four operational definitions of PS and their main characteristics
Autobiographical facts Self-knowledge Repeated events AS conceptsa
Examples My brother’s
name is Nicholas
I am a stubborn person I brought my brother
to school every day
Knowledge that Barack
Obama is President +
Recollection of an
argument with my
brother as to whether
he should be re-elected
Typical neural
correlates
MPFC, retrosplenial
cortex, temporal pole,
posterior temporal cortex
MPFC, retrosplenial cortex,
precuneus, middle and inferior
temporal gyri, inferior
parietal lobe
MPFC, hippocampus,
para-hippocampal gyrus,
temporo-parietal junction,
fusiform gyrus, inferior
temporal cortex
MTL, temporo-parietal
junction, ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex, fusiform
gyrus
Neuropsychological
patterns
Similar to GS Different from GS and EM Similar to EM Similar to EM
aAbbreviations: AS concepts, autobiographically significant concepts; GS, general semantic memory; EM, episodic memory; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; MTL, medial
temporal lobe.
Box 1. Two common methods for assessing PS in
autobiographical memory: the Autobiographical Memory
Interview and the Autobiographical Interview
The Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) [14] refers to PS as
‘factual knowledge about a person’s own past’, which corresponds
best to the category of autobiographical facts in our classification
scheme of operational definitions. In the AMI, PS is evaluated using
questions about decontextualized facts, such as names of schools
one attended, names of friends and colleagues, and addresses
where one lived. One of the AMI’s main goals is to assess PS and
EM in a similar manner across the same three time periods:
childhood, early adult life, and recent years. Although the AMI
enables the comparison of PS and EM, the standard version does
not contain a GS condition. For example, in the original study [14],
PS was implicitly considered as part of GS, although GS was not
formally assessed by means other than a famous personalities test.
Subsequent neuropsychological studies using the AMI have shown
that PS and GS (assessed by other means) are often preserved or
impaired together in patients (see main text), suggesting that their
neural bases are similar. However, the fact that GS is not examined
formally in the AMI makes it more difficult to compare PS, EM, and
GS with one another.
A different approach is taken in Levine et al.’s [72] Autobiogra-
phical Interview (AI) in which participants’ descriptions of autobio-
graphical events are scored for episodic and semantic details
(among other types). No attempt is made to differentiate these
types of memory from one another at the time of the interview; this
is done only at the time of scoring. In the standard version, semantic
details are not separated into PS versus GS categories (but see [38]
for a modified version that evaluates PS as repeated events).
However, the AI method could easily be modified to probe memory
for PS details more specifically.
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memory for repeated and unique episodes after medial
temporal lobe lesions [6,38]. Neuroimaging studies indi-
cate that repeated events differ from all other forms of PS
in that they are associated (as are unique events) with
hippocampal/medial temporal lobe activity [29,31,39].
Note that similar findings have been observed for unique
episodes when they are retrieved repeatedly [40,41]. How-
ever, some differences between repeated and unique
events have been noted in functional neuroimaging stud-
ies: the medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal gyrus,
right parahippocampal gyrus, right temporoparietal junc-
tion, and precuneus show greater activation for unique
relative to repeated events [29–31,39]. By contrast, these
same studies found greater activity in the left parahippo-
campal gyrus, left temporoparietal junction, fusiform gyri
and right inferior temporal cortex for repeated than unique
events. Taken together, these studies suggest that, al-
though memory for repeated events can be differentiated
from both GS and EM, this form of PS has much more in
common with EM than with GS. Therefore, even though
the dearth of studies on PS has sometimes resulted in our
treating autobiographical facts and repeated events as
belonging to the same category of semantic autobiographi-
cal memory [42], this may not be appropriate. Memory for
unique and repeated events can be thought of as relying on
different weightings of the same component processes
(Box 5). Although they both include spatial and temporal
features, as well as a subjective sense of re-experiencing
events, unique events typically include more elaborated
sensory imagery (perhaps owing to greater precuneus
activation) and self-reflection (perhaps due to greater me-
dial prefrontal cortex activation) than do repeated events.
Autobiographically significant concepts
A third way to study PS is through autobiographically
significant concepts, that is, semantic concepts that are
Box 2. PS as a sub-domain of semantic memory
Is PS simply an aspect of GS, with similar organizing principles? This
is a parsimonious assumption made by many investigators. On the
face of it, the case in which this argument seems easiest to make is
when PS is operationalized as autobiographical facts, but even here
there are some differences between PS and GS in terms of their
neural correlates. It may be that PS is a sub-domain of GS with
overlapping, but partly distinct neural correlates. This is compatible
with the picture of a complex, distributed semantic system in the
brain, with different categories of objects (e.g., animals, tools, faces)
represented preferentially by different brain regions [9,73,74]. PS may
be one such category. A PS category in the semantic system would
likely have played a useful role in evolution, a criterion that is
considered essential for category specificity [74]. In functional
neuroimaging studies, medial prefrontal, temporal polar, retrosple-
nial, and precuneus regions seem to be critical for the representation
of personal aspects of semantic memory (Figure I). The medial
prefrontal cortex, heavily involved in self-referential processing [26],
is active in the most abstract forms of PS, namely autobiographical
facts and self-knowledge (with activity centered around BA 10 in both
cases). The temporal poles, known to support the representation of
unique entities (e.g., [24,25]), are one of the brain regions most
robustly associated with the representation of autobiographical facts.
Finally, the retrosplenial cortex and precuneus, considered to play an
important role in the interface of GS and EM [3], show greater activity
for self-knowledge (as well as for autobiographical facts, in the case of
retrosplenial cortex) than for GS. Importantly, these areas are coactive
with other brain regions associated with GS, such as posterior and
inferior temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobe, which is compatible
with a conception of PS as a sub-domain of semantic memory.
Information about personal relevance could thus be appended to
existing semantic information [12]. Alternatively, for other types of
PS, associated EMs could be added to semantic knowledge. This is
most clearly seen in autobiographically significant concepts, which
seem to be represented both in semantic and episodic memory
[44,45], and thus constitute an amalgamation between GS and EM
rather than a sub-system of GS.[(Box_2)TD$FIG]
Lateral view
Medial view
Ventral view
Anterior
Posterior
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Figure I. Personal semantics (PS) as a sub-domain of semantic memory.
Schematic view of the brain with lateral, medial, and ventral orientations.
Areas in red show the approximate locations of the regions typically implicated
in general semantic (GS) processing of concrete objects ([2,9]; see also the
semantic convergence zones in [3]). In yellow are the approximate locations of
regions that show greater activity for the more abstract forms of PS
(autobiographical facts and self-knowledge) than for GS. In orange are the
approximate locations where GS and PS overlap.
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associated with vivid EMs from our lives. Conceptually,
this form of PS is at the intersection of GS and EM
(Table 1). In contrast to other forms of PS, it does not relate
to knowledge of personal events or the self, but rather to
semantic information, which, by its tight association with
specific episodes, has high degrees of personal significance
and emotional salience [43].
In initial work on this phenomenonwith healthy people,
Westmacott and Moscovitch [44] showed that famous
names that brought to mind personally-significant EMs
Box 3. The continuum perspective
A number of continua have been proposed to describe how
declarative memory, autobiographical memory, and knowledge are
organized. In each of these domains, the continuum ranges from the
specific to the general, in terms of the kind and/or quality of
information represented: in declarative memory models, the range
is from episodic to semantic memory [75–79]; in autobiographical
memory models it is from specific episodes to summarized/repeated
events to abstract knowledge (‘life time periods’; [34]; see also [80]); in
knowledge/semantic memory models [81–84], it is from more specific
and context-bound semantic representations to more abstract and
context-free ones. Perhaps PS should be thought of as an inter-
mediate step between the episodic and the semantic memory
systems (Figure I). In all of the aforementioned models, the most
abstract information is also the least personally relevant. According to
this perspective, the personal aspects of semantic memory may
generally be less abstracted than GS (e.g., my collie vs the general
category of collies) and have privileged interactions with specific
episodes. Indeed, Conway ([85]) found that only less abstracted
semantic categories could prime the retrieval of EMs. These results
are complemented by recent neuroimaging studies that show that
certain inherently autobiographical semantic categories (‘names of
friends’) are associated with hippocampal/medial temporal activa-
tions [86,87], brain regions usually associated with episodic retrieval.
If one considers PS as an intermediate system in a continuum of
abstraction from GS to EM, one might expect to see quantitative rather
than qualitative variations in brain activity across these memory types.
Indeed, several neuroimaging studies have found a graded decreasing
pattern of activity from EM to autobiographical facts to GS in medial
prefrontal, temporal polar and retrosplenial cortex ([21,22,27], see also
[42]). The precuneus also shows a graded reduction of activity from EM
to self-knowledge to GS [63]. However, the interpretation of these
observations is complicated by the fact that very few studies have
included all three types of memory (i.e., PS, GS and EM). A further
problem with the continuum perspective is that there may still be a
qualitative gap between the less abstracted forms of personal knowl-
edge (i.e., repeated events) and EM, notably in term of time frame
(shorter for episodes), related awareness (noetic vs autonoetic aware-
ness, Box 4), and visual imagery (generic for PS vs detailed for EM).
[(Box_3)TD$FIG]
Recollecon of
watching last
week’ s dog show
Superordinate level
categories of knowledge:
Animal
Basic level categories of knowledge:
Dog
Subordinate level
categories of knowledge:
Collie
General event knowledge/scripts:
A typical dog show 
Specific event knowledge:
The dog show I went to last week
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Figure I. The continuum perspective. This figure represents a hypothetical continuum of content in general semantics (GS, in blue) and personal semantics (PS, in
orange). In both GS and PS, representations become less and less abstracted and more and more context-dependent, from the higher to the lower levels of
representation (see [81]). According to this perspective, the personal aspects of semantic memory may be less abstracted than GS (but still related in content, as
indicated by the dotted lines). Moreover, in GS itself, less abstracted representations are also more experience-near and thus more personal, while still being part of
semantic knowledge (i.e., knowledge of events such as ‘The dog show I went to last week.’ [34]). Autobiographically significant concepts are semantic concepts that are
associated with vivid episodic memories (EMs). In this example, the concept of ‘dog shows’ becomes autobiographically significant by virtue of its association with
episodic recollection of last week’s dog show (in purple). Episodic recollection can be associated with concepts at a less abstracted level of representation, although this
becomes less likely as abstraction increases.
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were associated with superior performance on tests of
semantic and episodic memory, compared to less person-
ally-significant (but equally familiar) famous names.West-
macott et al. [45] (see also [43]) found that this performance
advantage was absent in Alzheimer’s and amnesic
patients, two groups with severe EM impairment due to
medial temporal lobe damage. By contrast, the advantage
was preserved in semantic dementia patients, who have
marked deficits in the ability to remember semantic con-
cepts, stemming from lateral temporal lobe deterioration
(see also [46] for similar results using public events instead
of famous names). These results suggest that, although
famous names are thought to be represented in semantic
memory, the performance advantage seen for autobio-
graphically significant names may derive from the addi-
tional influence of EM.
A number of neuroimaging studies have investigated
the impact of self-relevance on neural activity, comparing,
for example, personally known versus unknown (or
famous) faces, names, objects, or scenes (reviewed in
[42]). However, in these studies, personally relevant sti-
muli typically differ from control stimuli not only by their
association with EMs, but also by a greater degree of
familiarity and associated knowledge. This confound was
taken into account in an fMRI study by Denkova, Botzung
and Manning [47], in which names and faces of famous
Box 4. Participants in psychology experiments do not necessarily access the representations we assume they do
It is always difficult to be certain that one is making the correct
inferences about underlying cognitive processes based on behavior.
For instance, single episodes can later be retrieved as autobiogra-
phical facts: I may know what occurred during my brother’s speech at
my wedding, without having a perceptually rich, first-person re-
experiencing of it. In other words, this single event could be retrieved
with noetic awareness, that is, the type of awareness that is
associated with knowing about the world and retrieving semantic
knowledge, rather than with autonoetic awareness, that is, the type
of awareness associated with subjectively re-experiencing events
from EM [1]. As Tulving cautioned, there is always the ‘possibility of
[our] answering questions directed to episodic memory on the basis
of our general knowledge of the world’ ([91]; see also[32]). According
to this view, even if the probability of autonoetically re-experiencing
events in their original episodic context is greater for unique
instances, both single and repeated events can be associated with
either autonoetic or noetic remembering. To overcome this diffi-
culty, the remember/know procedure [92], in which participants
report on the type of awareness that they have experienced during
retrieval, can be used, as can other methods (e.g., [93]). Alternatively,
it would be interesting to train participants to retrieve memories
voluntarily in either the noetic or the autonoetic mode. A prior
selection of vivid memories of personal experiences would be
necessary. The recall phase would then entail focusing either on the
meaning and knowledge associated with a personal experience
(third-person remembering) or on attempting to re-experience it in
its original context (first-person recollection). In addition to allowing
for a better control of retrieval mode, it would also allow for
comparisons between very similar memories (e.g, unique events
retrieved in the noetic vs autonoetic mode) matched in content and
age between the two conditions (for a similar approach with the cue-
word technique see [94]). This enterprise, however, may face other
challenges. Among them is the possibility that EM processes and
information may be activated initially relatively automatically
[44,86,87], with the participant’s awareness of this retrieved in-
formation emerging only at a later stage of processing.
Box 5. The component processes view
The effective encoding and retrieval of declarative memories depends
on multiple mnemonic and other processes, including attention, self-
reflection, emotion, spatial and temporal processing, sensory-percep-
tual imagery, and executive functions [78,88,89]. One way to
conceptualize how PS, GS, and EM fit together is to assume that
these three types of memory simply rely on different weightings of
the aforementioned component processes [90].
According to this view, EM might involve a greater degree of self-
reflection, self-projection in time and space, emotion, and sensory-
perceptual imagery than PS and GS (Table I). In turn, PS might differ
from GS in terms of the former’s greater involvement of self-
reflection, and possibly a greater degree of emotional involvement.
The precise differences between PS, EM, and GS will depend on how
PS is operationalized. For example, some forms of PS, such as
memory for repeated events, appear to contain spatial and temporal
features, and may share with EM a chronological re-experiencing of
the event from a first-person perspective. However, they might still
differ from EM in terms of sensory imagery and self-reflection.
Neuroimaging studies have indeed found greater activity for unique
than repeated events in the precuneus and medial prefrontal cortex
[30,31,39], involved respectively in visuo-spatial processing and self-
reflection. These forms of PS (e.g., bringing my brother to school
every day) would be interesting to compare to elaborated scripts (e.g.,
going to school), which are considered part of GS [81]. It is likely that
they would differ mainly in terms of a greater reliance on personal
reflection for PS than for GS and possibly also in terms of more
elaborated sensory imagery (instead of generic images). Finally, self-
knowledge can be considered to involve a more abstract form of self-
reflection than EM, with less sensory imagery and less rich subjective
projection in time and space. Self-knowledge is the only form of PS
which shows similar activation in medial prefrontal cortex to EM. In
contrast, EM is associated with greater activity than self-knowledge in
brain areas related to visuospatial processing, including the pre-
cuneus and superior and inferior parietal lobules.
Table I. The component processes view. The component processes view conceptualizes the different types of PS, GS, and EM as
representing different weighting of various cognitive processes. The ‘+’ sign represents the weighting of the relevant cognitive
processes (more pluses correspond to greater weight).
GS Autobiographical facts Self-knowledge Repeated events AS concepts EM
Self-reflection _ + + ++ ++ +++
Sensory-perceptual imagery Poor Poor Poor Generic Detailed Detailed
Spatial/temporal features + + + ++ ++ +++
Emotional valence _ + ++ + ++ +++
Possibility of eliciting recollection Poor Poor
(may vary with recency)
Poor Good Good Systematic
Typical perspective 3rd Person 3rd Person 3rd Person 1st Person 1st/3rd Person 1st Person
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people high or low in autobiographical significance – but
equal in familiarity – were compared. The results of this
study converged with the neuropsychological data to sug-
gest that autobiographically significant concepts do indeed
depend on the medial temporal lobe (see also [48]),
although they also identified other brain regions, such
as the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the temporo-
parietal junction, the fusiform gyrus, and the lingual gy-
rus. These results were interpreted as indicating that
autobiographically relevant concepts may involve more
effortful retrieval (left prefrontal activation), the activation
of richer autobiographical information (temporo-parietal
junction), and the retrieval of sensory perceptual details
(lingual gyrus) [47]. A recent event-related potential (ERP)
study (Renoult et al., unpublished data) provides further
evidence of the episodic nature of autobiographically sig-
nificant concepts: compared to famous names for which
participants had only general knowledge, autobiographi-
cally significant names were associated with increased
amplitude of the late positive component (LPC), an ERP
index of episodic recollection [49]. In contrast, the N400
component, an ERP index of semantic processing [50], did
not differentiate the two kinds of names, but instead was
related to the amount of semantic knowledge participants
had of each famous person. These results suggest that
autobiographically significant concepts differ from other
concepts by being represented in EM, in addition to seman-
tic memory. Crucially, as in the original paradigm [44,45],
autobiographical significance was incidental to task perfor-
mance as it was determined by a separate sample of parti-
cipants or by the subjects themselves but at the end of the
experiment. This suggests that the activation of relevant
episodic information by these concepts is automatic and,
more generally, that this information is an intrinsic part of
autobiographically significant concepts.
Although not as well-studied as the other forms of PS,
autobiographically significant concepts constitute a prom-
ising way to study interactions between GS and EM. The
data available so far suggest that this form of PS, like
memory for repeated events, has neural correlates that are
similar to those of EM.
When PS appears dissimilar to both GS and
EM: self-knowledge
A fourth tradition of work on PS focuses on the self, self-
image, and personal identity. For example, Neisser [51]
proposed that the conceptual self is the most basic form of
self-knowledge, allowing us to reflect on our personal
characteristics and attributes (e.g., ‘I am a fast reader,
but poor at remembering names’). Similarly, Brewer [32]
refers to the self-schema as a ‘cognitive structure that
contains generic knowledge about the self’. Self-knowledge
has most often been operationalized as the summary of
one’s personality traits (e.g., ‘I am a stubborn person’
[52,53]). Because they focus on self-image, these aspects
of PS may be strongly influenced by emotional and social
factors both during encoding and retrieval [54], and could
play a crucial role in maintaining a concept of self that
would fitwith the rememberer’s goals and emotions [55]. In
addition, self-knowledge may be differentiated from other
forms of autobiographical knowledge by slower updating
mechanisms [56]. These psychological characteristics, to-
gether with the neuropsychological data (see below), argue
against the idea of self-knowledge being a subset of the
category of autobiographical facts (Table 1).
Behavioral studies by Klein and collaborators have
dissociated self-knowledge from EM and GS. In these
studies, self-knowledge was operationalized as knowledge
of one’s personality traits. Using a priming design, Klein
and Loftus [57] showed that judging the self-relevance of a
trait (PS condition) did not influence the time required for
participants to recollect an event in which they displayed
that personality trait (EM condition). Similarly, judging
whether a trait was self-relevant did not influence the time
it took to define that trait (GS condition). These behavioral
results, therefore, suggest a relative independence of trait
self-knowledge fromEM or GS related to these traits ([52]).
In neuropsychological work, Klein and colleagues
showed that self-knowledge can be preserved when EM
and GS are impaired ([58–60], see also [36]) and preserved
even when knowledge of autobiographical facts is impaired
[60,61]. This form of PS was considered to be intact when
reasonable correlations were found between patients’ self-
reports about their personality traits and reports from
family members. Klein and colleagues interpreted their
results as indicating that self-knowledge may be a special-
ized subsystem within semantic memory.
Neuroimaging studies have found that self-knowledge,
as operationalized by the self-evaluation of one’s personal-
ity traits or by self-evaluative judgments (‘I enjoy going to
New Year’s parties.’; [62–64]), is associated with neural
correlates that are somewhat distinct from those of EMand
GS. The medial prefrontal cortex (BA 10, extending into
BA 9), posterior cingulate cortex (including the retrosple-
nial cortex), and precuneus have consistently shown great-
er activity for self-knowledge than for GS (operationalized
as judging the valence of the traits [65–69] or as verifying
statements of factual knowledge [62–64,70]). The same
regions of the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cin-
gulate cortex were also found to be activated for EM
(operationalized as verifying sentences about unique
events [63] or as recognizing previously studied pictures
[71]). In contrast, these same studies reported that EMwas
associated with greater activity than PS in brain regions
related to visuo-spatial processing, such as the precuneus
and the superior and inferior parietal lobules. Finally, self-
knowledge was also found to activate brain regions often
associated with GS [3], such as the left middle and inferior
temporal gyrus and left inferior parietal lobe [64–66,71],
and the left temporal pole [62]. Together, the neuropsy-
chological and neuroimaging evidence suggests that self-
knowledge is the form of PS that is the most easily disso-
ciable from GS and EM, although further evidence is
required. For example, the case for PS being truly inde-
pendent of EM and GS would be stronger if the opposite
neuropsychological dissociation from Klein and colleagues’
[52] had ever been reported (that is, a patient with im-
paired self-knowledge, but intact EM and GS). In addition,
the evidence of overlapping neuroimaging patterns for self-
knowledge and GS is compatible with Klein et al.’s hypoth-
esis that the self-knowledge aspect of PS is supported by
semantic memory [52] (Box 2).
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences November 2012, Vol. 16, No. 11
555
Author's personal copy
Concluding remarks
Even though the empirical assessment of PS first began 30
years ago [4], this field is still in its infancy. Up to the
present, the study of PS has largely been restricted to the
autobiographical memory literature, as PS is typically not
included inmodels of semanticmemory or knowledge. The
dearth of research on PS may have been due to the as-
sumption made by many researchers that PS is highly
similar to, or even synonymous with, GS. Here, we have
shown that this is an oversimplification. Whereas
some forms of PS (e.g., autobiographical facts) appear to
have neural correlates that are very similar to GS, others
(e.g., memory for repeated events and autobiographically
significant concepts) have neural correlates that aremuch
more similar to those of EM. Finally, self-knowledge is a
form of PS that seems to be at least partly dissociable from
GS and EM.
Three broad conceptualizations of PS can be articulated:
the GS, continuum, and component processes views, out-
lined in Boxes 2, 3 and 5. Each of these might best describe
one or two of the four different operational definitions of PS
we have outlined, but not others. For instance, knowledge
of autobiographical facts, and perhaps self-knowledge,
might best be viewed as subdomains/categories of semantic
memory (Box 2). The more episodic types of PS, such as
memory for repeated events, could perhaps most easily be
integrated into models of declarative memory by proposing
either a continuum of abstraction in knowledge represen-
tations (Box 3) or a component processes approach (Box 5).
Although a continuummodel would be supported by quan-
titative variations in brain activity seen in a number of
regions when comparing EM, PS and GS [21,22,27,63], a
component process view may better account for the quali-
tative gap that appears to exist between the less abstracted
form of PS (such as memory for repeated events) and EM.
At present, the data are insufficient to adjudicate among
these different models of PS. Future work should distin-
guish among the four types of PS we have outlined here,
because they seem to have at least somewhat different
cognitive and neural bases from one another. Careful
comparisons of these four forms of PS with one another
and with EM and GS should help to shed light not only on
the nature of PS but also on declarative memory and
knowledge more broadly (Box 6).
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